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THE CONTINUING SEARCH FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT 
By William D. Kirchick* 
INTRODUCTION 
For almost five years environmental advocates have argued for 
the existence of a fundamental right to a non-hazardous environ-
ment. 1 Recently, supporters of this position received their sharpest 
setback when a Federal District Court ruled in Pinkney v. Ohio 
Environmental Protection Agency,2 (hereinafter cited as Pinkney), 
that the right to a non-hazardous environment is not a fundamental 
right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. To reach this 
result, the Pinkney court relied on the criteria set forth by the Su-
preme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez,3 (hereinafter cited as Rodriguez), as to what constitutes 
a fundamental right. Under the prevailing test established by the 
majority opinion in Rodriguez, the importance of a right is not the 
critical determinant in deciding whether that right is explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.4 
Petitioners in Pinkney had instituted a class action on behalf of 
all Cuyahoga County residents praying for a preliminary injunction 
against the construction of what they contended would be the larg-
est enclosed shopping center mall in the United States.5 The action 
was brought against the construction company, the Ohio Environ-
mental Protection Agency (OEPA), the Administrator of the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the village of 
North Randall, Cuyahoga County, and the State of Ohio, alleging 
violations of the Clean Air Act of 19708 and the United States Con-
stitution. In their Post Hearing Brief, plaintiffs asserted that there 
exists a federal constitutional right to freedom from unreasonable 
contamination of air, water and other fundamental life sources that 
can only be protected by affirmative state government enforcement, 
and that the lack of such enforcement constitutes a denial of sub-
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stantive and procedural due process actionable under the Civil 
Rights Act. 7 Applying the Rodriguez test,S the Pinkney court did not 
find any guarantee of a healthful environment in the Federal Con-
stitution and therefore could not rule that the claimed right was 
fundamental. 9 
Pinkney is the first case in the environmental area to apply the 
Rodriguez test of what constitutes a fundamental right. If future 
courts follow the Pinkney approach, environmental lawyers will be 
forced to seek other than constitutional avenues for environmental 
protection. However, in order to appreciate the context in which the 
Pinkney decision was rendered, it is necessary to examine previous 
cases which have addressed the issue of a constitutionally protected 
right to a healthful environment. 
I. PRIOR DECISIONS 
In Ely v. Velde,1O (hereinafter cited as Ely), the residents of a 
Virginia community brought an action against the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the Director of the 
Virginia Department of Welfare and Institutions to halt the pro-
posed funding and construction of a medical and reception center 
for state prisoners in their neighborhood, which contained certain 
historic sites. Federal funding of the project was enjoined on the 
grounds that the LEAA must comply with the procedural require-
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the 
National Historical Protection Act (NHPA) in approving block 
grants to states for law enforcement purposes}1 However, the court 
found that the requirements of NEPA and NHPA were addressed 
only to Federal agencies. Therefore, the court refused to issue an 
injunction against the State officials' failure to consider the environ-
mental and cultural impact of the proposed center.i2 
Alternatively, the Ely petitioners contended that apart from 
NEPA and NHPA, the federal constitution was violated by the 
State director's "unreasonable and arbitrary action" in placing the 
proposed center in their community. The Ely court declined the 
invitation to elevate this contention to a constitutional level, ob-
serving that ". . . [W]hile a growing number of commentators 
argue in support of constitutional protection for the environment, 
this newly-advanced constitutional doctrine has not yet been ac-
corded judicial sanction; and appellants do not present a convincing 
case for doing SO."13 
Other cases have been more explicit in their reasoning. In 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,!" (hereinafter 
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cited as Environmental Defense Fund), the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Arkansas expressed its sensitivity to petitioner's 
constitutional claims. However, the court felt that the principle of 
judicial restraint precluded the announcement of a new doctrine of 
such proportions: 
The Court is not insensitive to the positions asserted by the plain-
tiffs. . . Those who would attempt to protect the environment through 
the Courts are striving mightily to carve out a mandate from the existing 
provisions of our Constitution. Others have proposed amendments to 
our Constitution for this purpose .... Such claims, even under our 
present Constitution, are not fanciful and may, indeed, some day, in one 
way or another, obtain judicial recognition. But as stated by Judge 
Learned Hand in Spector Motor Servo Inc. V. Walsh, 139 F. 2d 809 (2nd. 
Cir. 1944): 'Nor is it desirable for it lower court to embrace the exhilarat-
ing opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb 
of time, but whose birth is distant.' The Ninth Amendment may well 
be as important in the development of constitutional law during the 
remainder of this century as the Fourteenth Amendment has been since 
the beginning of the century. But the Court concludes that the plaintiffs 
have not stated facts which would under the present state of the law 
constitute a violation of their constitutional rights .... The Court's 
decision on this point gives further emphasis to its statement, supra, 
that final decisions in matters of this type must rest with the legislative 
and executive branches of government. 15 
The only other case which held (based upon its own reasoning 
rather than past precedents) that the right to a clean environment 
could not be found in the Constitution was Tanner V. Armco Steel 
Corp.,16 (hereinafter cited as Tanner). In that case, plaintiffs 
brought an action to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained 
from air pollutants emitted by defendant's petroleum refineries and 
plants located along the Houston Ship Channel. Among the claims 
raised by plaintiffs in their jurisdictional statement were allegations 
of a federal question under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983), and its jurisdictional 
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3). The court dismissed the com-
plaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 17 
Since environmental protection is not explicitly provided in the 
text of the Constitution, the Tanner plaintiffs contended that the 
right to a healthful environment is one of the "other" rights "re-
tained by the people" under the Ninth Amendment. ls The court 
declined to accept this position and noted that: 
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The parties have cited and the Court has found no reported cases in 
which the Ninth Amendment has been construed to embrace the rights 
here asserted. Such a construction would be ahistorical and would repre-
sent essentially a policy decision. In effect, plaintiffs invite this Court 
to enact a law. Since our system reserves to the legislative branch the 
task of legislating, this Court must decline the invitation. The Ninth 
Amendment through its "penumbra" or otherwise, embodies no legally 
assertable right to a healthful environment}' 
On the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court found that plain-
tiffs had not met the minimum requirements for alleging "state 
action"20 on the part of defendants. Assuming arguendo that state 
action was present, the court advanced four reasons for rejecting 
plaintiffs' contention that defendants had violated any judicially 
cognizable federal constitutional right: 
First, there is not a scintilla of persuasive content in the words, origin, 
or historical setting of the Fourteenth Amendment to support the asser-
tion that environmental rights were to be accorded its protection. To 
perceive such content in the Amendment would be to tum somersaults 
with history .... Second, it is apparent that nowhere in the Fourteenth 
Amendment-or its "incorporated" amendments-can be found the 
decisional standards to guide a court in determining whether the plain-
tiffs' hypothetical environmental rights have been infinged, and, if so, 
what remedies are to be fashioned .... Third, from an institutional 
viewpoint, the judicial process, through constitutional litigation, is pe-
culiary ill-suited to solving problems of environmental control. ... 
Finally, to the extent that an environmental controversy ... is pres-
ently justiciable, it is within the province of the law of torts, to wit: 
nuisance.2! 
The court concluded that if it were desirable to effect a wholesale 
transformation of state tort suits into federal cases, ". . .it should 
be accomplished by Congress through legislation, and not by the 
courts through jurisdictional alchemy. "22 
Almost all other cases which decided the issue of a fundamental 
right to a "clean" or "non-hazardous"23 environment have followed 
the reasoning developed in the Ely,24 Environmental Defense 
Fund,25 or Tanner28 cases. One case was ambivalent as to the posi-
tion it took,27 and only in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner 
Waldorf,28 (hereinafter cited as Waldorf), has a court clearly recog-
nized that". . .each of us is constitutionally protected in our natu-
ral and personal state of life and health."2. However, Waldorf was 
dismissed because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate state action. 
Several reasons for the courts' reluctance to grant constitutional 
recognition to the right to a non-hazardous environment can be 
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distilled from the cases. (1) According to the majority in Rodrigeuz, 
an interest is deemed fundamental and therefore granted constitu-
tional stature only if it is explicitly or implicitly found in the Consti-
tution. It has been argued that the guarantee to a non-hazardous 
environment does not meet this criterion, and thus does not meet 
the prevailing test of what constitutes a fundamental right.3o (2) It 
has also been contended that there is no indication in the words, 
origin or historical setting of the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause to support the assertion that environmental rights 
were to be within its scope. Therefore, to grant such protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause would con-
travene the intent of the framers of the Amendment.3! (3) Similarly, 
it has been argued that nothing indicates that the Ninth Amend-
ment or the "penumbras"32 of the first eight amendments embrace 
a legally assertable right to a non-hazardous environment.33 (4) It 
has also been observed that if the courts were to derive such a right 
from the Ninth Amendment, the penumbras of the first eight 
amendments, or the Fifth Amendment through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would be granting sub-
stantive due process protection to litigants, and arguably usurping 
legislative· powers, a role which the Supreme Court unequivocally 
renounced in the late 1930'S.34 (5) Furthermore, one court has ob-
served that individual litigants can obtain judicial redress on the 
local level through nuisance suits, and, were it desirable to cope 
with such problems on a nationwide scale, the task should more 
properly be left to Congress.35 (6) Others believe that from an insti-
tutional viewpoint, the judicial process should not engage in matters 
inherently political because of the potential trade-off between eco-
nomic and ecological values presented by the question.38 (7) Finally, 
it has been argued that there are no decisional standards to guide a 
court in determining whether a plaintiff's hypothethical environ-
mental rights have been infringed, and if so, what remedies are to 
be fashioned. 37 It is submitted that each of the above arguments can 
be answered, and that the courts should recognize a constitutional 
right to a reasonably non-hazardous environment. 
II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that the Texas scheme of 
financing public elementary and secondary education, relying pri-
marily upon local ad valorem property taxes, was not a denial of 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, even though 
the scheme resulted in disparities between school districts in the 
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amount of funds available for educational expenditures. Among the 
claims raised by petitioner was that the Texas system must be 
subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because 
education is a fundamental personal right. In rejecting this claim, 
Justice Powell,-writing for the majority, stated that "the importance 
of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under 
the Equal Protection Clause."38 Rather, he concluded, " ... the 
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explic-
itly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."3t 
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Marshall argued that neither 
the right to procreate,40 the right to vote in state elections,41 nor the 
right to an appeal from a criminal conviction42 could be found in the 
text of the Constitution and yet each had been granted protection 
by the Court in the past. 43 "These are instances in which, due to the 
importance of the interests at stake, the Court has displayed a 
strong concern with the existence of discriminatory state treatment. 
But the Court has never said or indicated that these are interests 
which independently enjoy full-blown constitutional protection."44 
Various commentators have characterized the majority's standard 
as an unreasonably narrow reading of the precedents,45 while one has 
gone so far as to say that it is contradictory to some of the Court's 
other holdings in the area of fundamental rights.48 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the majority's standard is 
itself a judicial construct and not a constitutional mandate. Thus, 
as Justice Marsha1l47 and one commentator48 have noted, the 
Rodriguez Court arbitrarily placed a limit on selecting what are to 
be fundamental rights in an equal protection analysis without suffi-
ciently distinguishing the clear trend of recent decisions. 
There were no due process issues in Rodriguez; Justice Powell was 
addressing the specific issue of standards of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause.48 Thus, one cannot help asking whether the ma-
jority opinion implicitly recognized that an entirely different con-
ceptual approach to the issue of fundamental rights may exist when 
scrutinized under the Due Process Clause.5o 
For example, in Rodriguez Justice Powell made a point of distin-
guishing the Supreme Court's prior wealth discrimination cases. He 
found that those cases required a class of plaintiffs who were". . . 
completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a conse-
quence, had sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful op-
portunity to enjoy that benefit"51 (emphasis added). Having found 
in those cases a requirement of absolute deprivation before relief 
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could be granted, Justice Powell observed that a mere showing that 
pupils living in poorer districts received a poorer quality education 
does not, in and of itself, establish a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.52 He relied on Texas' assertion that it was providing an 
"adequate" education for all children in the state.53 Then he stated 
that even if education were a fundamental interest, Texas furnished 
enough of it to ". . . provide each child with an opportunity to ac-
quire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the 
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process/'54 
In this way Justice Powell incorporated an "adequacy argument" 
into his definition of determining when fundamental rights arise 
under the Equal Protection Clause.55 His approach has been 
severely criticized for having turned the Equal Protection Clause 
into an "adequacy protection" clause.58 
Without elaborating on the merits of this criticism, it should be 
pointed out that the Court rarely discusses the "adequacy" of the 
interests at stake when engaging in a due process analysis. 57 Instead, 
. it asks whether or not the party claiming relief has been deprived 
of a right in absolute terms. That is, when members of society (not 
consigned to a discriminatory classification) are or potentially could 
be deprived of a given right by the government, the question be-
comes one of whether they have been denied due process of law. 58 
In due process cases, the Court does not speak in relative terms as 
under an equal protection analysis. Instead, it determines whether 
the right allegedly being denied is recognized in law. If so, the Court 
will define that right, deriving it from the Constitution. Then it 
must decide if the State has certain countervailing interests which 
would allow it to place reasonable restraints on the exercise of that 
right. Where sufficient state interests are not present, the Court will 
then vindicate the claimed right.59 
Because of the "absolute" focus of a due process analysis (as 
distinguished from the "relative" or "adequacy" analysis in an 
equal protection examination) it is submitted that: (1) the Due 
Process Clause provides a stronger foundation for the derivation of 
the constitutional right to a reasonably non-hazardous environ-
ment, and (2) the limitations placed upon the definition of a funda-
mental right by the Rodriguez Court are inapposite when applied 
to a due process analysis.so 
III. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
is to render applicable to the states". . . immunities that are valid 
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as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of 
particular amendments [to the Federal Constitution]."61 However, 
the central issue is not the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but rather the test to be applied in determining which rights granted 
by the first eight amendments are to be incorporated under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's shorthand phrase "due process" and 
thereby rendered applicable to the states. 
In Palko v. Connecticut,82 (hereinafter cited as Palko), the Su-
preme Court held that a specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights was 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment only if 
denial of the right" ... violate[s] those 'fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
insti tutions'. "83 That is: "Is the right'. . .implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,' and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
valid as against the states?"84 
In Adamson v. California,85 (hereinafter cited as Adamson), Mr. 
Justice Black, in a dissenting opinion, opted for the principle of 
total incorporation of the specific Bill of Rights guarantees into the 
Fourteenth Amendment.88 He believed that the purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment was ". . . to extend to all the people of the 
nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights. . .",67 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is a shorthand expres-
sion which renders all of the rights granted by the first eight amend-
ments applicable to the states.88 
More recent decisions have adopted the compromise position of 
"selective incorporation", utilizing a more lenient test of what is 
"fundamental". As the Court recently noted, "Our recent cases 
have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic constitutional 
rights can be denied by the States as long as the totality of the 
circumstances does not disclose a denial of 'fundamental fair-
ness'. "89 But, while the specific holding in Palko has been overruled 
and its rationale severely questioned,70 the Court has been unwilling 
to adopt Justice Black's "total incorporation" thesis. 71 Rather, the 
present test appears to be that: 
Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is "funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice",. . . the same constitutional 
standards apply against both the State and Federal Govemments.72 
A parallel development in Constitutional law has been the recog-
nition that included within the specific rights enumerated in the 
Bill of Rights are several "implied" or "inchoate" rights which exist 
within the "penumbra" of the explicit rights contained in the first 
eight amendments to the Federal Constitution. An example is the 
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"right of privacy" found to be inherent in several of the amend-
ments which comprise the Bill of Rights, and the application of the 
right to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause.73 In a wide-ranging group of cases, the Supreme Court has 
found rights, not explicitly contained in the Bill of Rights, to be 
nonetheless implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution and therefore 
"fundamental" and entitled to constitutional protection. 74 Once 
such an implicit right is found to be fundamental it is "selectively 
incorporated" by the Due Process Clause and made equally applica-
ble to the states and federal government. 75 
It is also important to note the elastic nature of the due process 
concept - a characteristic of great importance to those who would 
bring environmental rights under its purview. In Wolf v. Colorado,76 
Justice Frankfurter observed that due process of law should be de-
fined within the context of our changing historical environment; 
that it is a "living principle": 
It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of 
what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living 
principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of 
what may at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of 
fundamental rights. To rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination 
of what is a fundamental right for purposes of legal enforcement may 
satisfy a longing for certainty but ignores the movements of a free so-
ciety. It belittles the scale of the conception of due process. The real clue 
to the problem confronting the judiciary in the application of the Due 
Process Clause is not to ask where the line is once and for all to be drawn 
but to recognize that it is for the Court to draw it by the gradual and 
empiric process of "inclusion and exclusion." Davidson v. New Orleans, 
96 U.S. 97, 104.77 
Juxtaposition of the elasticity of the due process concept with the 
growing number of "implicit" rights which have been found to be 
"fundamental" suggests that specific textual reference in the Con-
stitution to a reasonably non-hazardous environment is not a prere-
quisite to constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause: 
... the failure of the founding fathers to provide in explicit constitu-
tional language for guarantees against enviromental spoilage is easily 
explained. Despite their anxiety to enact a living constitution adapted 
to the needs of succeeding generations, they could no more have foreseen 
the given consequences of environmental contamination from their van-
tage point in an unpopulated simple agrarian economy than they could 
hve foreseen the development and constitutional implication of elec-
tronic eavesdropping devices, telephones or telephone booths.78 
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Therefore, even if it be conceded that "fundamental rights" must 
be narrowly construed under a Rodriguez-type equal protection 
analysis, it does not follow that a due process definition of such 
rights must be similarly restricted. To hold otherwise is to ignore the 
ability of the Due Process Clause to grow through interpretation and 
adaptation to changing social, historical and environmental condi-
tions.79 
IV. DERIVING THE RIGHT To A REASONABLY NON-HAZARDOUS 
ENVIRONMENT 
A. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
Having argued that the restrictive approach taken by the 
Rodriguez Court under the Equal Protection Clause should not con-
trol when a fundamental right to a reasonably non-hazardous envi-
ronment is asserted under a claim of denial of due process, it must 
then be asked where such a right can be found in the Constitution. 
It is submitted that the words "life" and "liberty" of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses constitute one source. 
Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a State 
may not". . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property without 
due process oflaw." Together with the Fifth Amendment it protects 
the right to life. Since human life may perish if the environment is 
destroyed, it can be argued that the preservation of our environment 
is a fundamental right or value, under the specific protection of the 
two amendments.8o 
The court in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf81 
noted that ". . . a person's health is what, in a most significant 
degree, sustains life," and that "life" is protected under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. It concluded, " ... each of us is con-
stitutionally protected in our natural and personal state of life and 
health."82 It might have added that our liberty and the various 
rights specifically enumerated in the Constitution may become 
meaningless abstractions if life itself is endangered by the assault 
of pollution on the human body. 83 
Liberty is also explicitly protected under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.84 In Roe v. Wade,85 the Supreme Court held 
that the State's interference with a woman's decision to end her 
pregnancy in the first trimester is a denial of due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In reaching this result, the Court ex-
pressed the belief that the right to privacy could be found in the 
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty.88 Moreover, 
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the majority of the Court intimated that liberty implicitly includes 
the right to be free from unhealthful influences87 and the right to 
personal bodily integrity.88 Arguably, it follows from the majority's 
approach in Roe u. Wade, that the concept of liberty embraces 
freedom from a contaminated environment. Furthermore, it is not 
unreasonable to contend that dangerous levels of dust, smog, water 
contaminants and other forms of pollution constitute unhealthful 
influences, unacceptably threatening to bodily integrity.89 
B. The Ninth Amendment 
It can also be argued that the existence of a right to a reasonably 
non-hazardous environment is implicit in the language of the Ninth 
Amendment. Numerous scholars,90 and three justices of the Su-
preme Court,91 have maintained that the Ninth Amendment does 
in fact constitute a basis for asserting rights which, although not 
enumerated in the Constitution, nonetheless protect individuals. 
After a detailed examination of the history of the Constitutional 
Convention debates, Bruce A. Beckman concluded that: 
The history of the Ninth Amendment. . . indicates beyond a doubt that 
the amendment expressed recognition of certain basic fundamental 
[sic] or natural rights beyond those expressly mentioned in the Bill of 
Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution. 92 
Similarly, in Griswold u. Connecticut,93 (hereinafter cited as 
Griswold) Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion noted that: 
The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the Constitution's 
authors that other fundamental personal rights should not be denied 
such protection or disparaged in any other way simply because they are 
not specifically listed in the first eight constitutional am"endments.94 
One author has suggested that the substance of Mr. Justice Gold-
berg's theory is indistinguishable from Mr. Justice Harlan's due 
process approach. 9s Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion in 
Griswold, discussed the two approaches together since he believed 
them to be essentially identica1.96 Indeed, in language reminiscent 
of several opinions by his senior colleague dealing with the Four-
teenth Amendment, Justice Goldberg observed that the existence of 
the Ninth Amendment ". . . lends strong support to the view that 
the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
. . . is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first 
eight amendments"97 (emphasis added). 
The approach used by Mr. Justice Goldberg to define fundamen-
tal rights in the context of the Ninth Amendment is similar to that 
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taken by the Court under the Due Process Clause.9S Under either 
approach "[Judges] must look to the 'traditions and [collective] 
conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so 
rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental'."99 Arguably, 
the right of all citizens to have an environment favorable to human 
life on a long-term basis derives from "the traditions and collective 
conscience of our people" and is thus protected under the Ninth 
Amendment. 
c. The Penumbra Approach 
Unlike the theory advanced under the Ninth Amendment by Mr. 
Justice Goldberg, the majority's opinion in Griswold limited the 
development of new rights to those implicit in expressed rights. loo 
The concept developed by the Court was that specific Bill of Rights 
guarantees would be less than meaningful unless ancillary "peri-
pheral" rights, evolved out of those explicit guarantees, were ele-
vated to a Constitutional plane. lOt These "penumbral" rights, as 
Justice Douglas referred to them, were" .. .formed by emanation 
from those [specific] guarantees, that help give them life and sub-
stance. "102 Douglas found the marital relationship to be within a 
zone of privacy created by the penumbras of the First, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, and therefore deserving of 
Constitutional protection. l03 
Justice Douglas did not employ Justice Goldberg's standard for 
determining which unenumerated rights were to be granted consti-
tutional protection. Instead, under the penumbra theory, a "peri-
pheral" right is constitutionally protected if ". . . its existence is 
necessary in making the express [Bill of Rights] guarantees fully 
meaningful. "104 
Even under this test the right to be free from unreasonable envi-
ronmental hazards should pass constitutional muster. The guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights are "fully meaningful" only if one is alive 
and healthy enough to exercise and enjoy them.lOs One can look to 
the penumbras of the Fifth and Ninth Amendments in order to 
substantiate this claim, since it is in these provisions that the Con-
stitution gives explicit expression to values of life and liberty. 106 
V. SUBSTANTIVE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE RETURN TO Lochner? 
This article has attempted to find the constitutional sources for 
the right to a reasonably non-hazardous environment. However, 
there are objections raised against alleged judicial "creation" of 
fundamental rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution 
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which must be addressed. 
In a long line of cases since 1934,107 the Supreme Court has implic-
itly overruled a doctrine of judicial activism in the area of economic 
and social legislation that was firmly established in Lochner v. New 
York/os (hereinafter cited as Lochner). In Lochner, the Co.urt had 
held that a State law regulating the hours of work in the bakery 
industry interfered with the liberty of the person to contract under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Under the Lochner approach, the Court freely utilized its sense 
of values in reviewing economic and social legislation challenged on 
due process grounds. loD As a result, the Court struck down as uncon-
stitutional a number of legislative enactments for the promotion of 
social and economic well-being when, in its view, the State had 
exceeded the bounds of its legitimate police power by interfering 
with substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It was felt 
that the social benefits ensuing from the exercise of the police 
power, however desirable they might be, were subordinate to values 
and rights which the Court believed to be part of the very fabric of 
the Constitution-e.g., "freedom of contract". 
With the abandonment of this approach, the Court adopted a 
more confined concept of judicial review. Today a legislature may 
act in any substantive area and such legislation will be upheld 
where it does not violate a constitutional immunity, is a valid exer-
cise of the police power, reasonably related to its ends and serves 
an adequate state interest. 110 However, at the same time that the 
Court was removing itself from an "activist" role in protecting eco-
nomic and social "liberties", it was becoming increasingly involved 
in protecting unenumerated personal "liberties" under the same 
Due Process Clause. In the name of fundamental rights of a proce-
dural nature, the Court began to strike down legislation, usually in 
the criminal law area, which was "shocking" or offended one's sense 
of justice. III 
The problem faced by those urging the extension of constitutional 
protection to the environment is to forfend the criticism of Justice 
Black, who ". . . plead[ ed] for a concept of judicial review based 
only on specific constitutional provisions lest another court in an-
other day use a flexible concept of due process to re-enact the sorry 
history of the mid-1930's."112 Justice Black has also argued that the 
recognition of unenumerated rights, whether under the Ninth 
Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, " ... require[s] judges to determine what is or is not consti-
tutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise 
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or unnecessary."113 Such a task, he believed, engages the Court in a 
process of legislative usurpation. 114 
One suspects Justice Black would argue that the substance/ 
procedure distinction, insofar as it relates to the Court's role in 
determining constitutional rights, is a chimera. Be that as it may, 
making the distinction permits a further argument to be advanced. 
Namely, that the distinction exists because, as to procedure: 
Courts are particularly qualified not only to formulate policies for the 
efficient conduct of litigation but to percieve the essentials of a fair trial, 
and the community is likely to accord substantial deference to that 
judicial expertise.115 
Specifically, in the area of environmental rights, it has been noted 
that: 
[A]ny attempts by the courts to recognize such imputed rights and 
fashion remedies for such rights would clearly constitute a usurpation 
of legislative power. A complex area such as the control of pollution 
demands not only a great deal of special expertise, but also an intricate 
balancing process whereby economic, social and political factors must 
be weighed. Functions such as these should properly be exercised by the 
legislatures on both the state and federallevels. 116 
It is further argued that the courts are not well suited as institutions 
to make these kinds of decisions, even if the subject matter were 
expressly placed under their primary jurisdiction. 117 
Thus several arguments can be arrayed against the propriety of 
judicial recognition of the existence of a fundamental right to a 
reasonably non-hazardous environment. On the constitutional level, 
two arguments are made: (1) were the Court to engage in creating 
substantive personal rights, a double standard of review would re-
sult depending on the nature of the claimed right, since it presently 
maintains a nearly "hands-off" attitude in the area of economic and 
social legislation; (2) it is beyond the province of the Court to guar-
antee constitutional protection to interests not explidtly mentioned 
in the Constitution. Otherwise, according to Justice Black, the 
Court undertakes a process whereby rights are created out of thin 
air on the basis of what judges today think makes good social policy. 
From an institutional viewpoint, two corellative arguments may be 
raised: (1) the inherent political nature of the competing interests 
at stake indicates that judicial interference in such matters consti-
tutes usurpation of legislative and executive powers; (2) the courts 
are not equipped with the requisite expertise to deal with adversary 
interests in this area of the law. That is, the courts arguably lack 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 529 
adequate standards for deciding what constitutes a hazard to the 
environment, and also for fashioning a proper remedy and supervis-
ing its implementation. 
However, these criticisms can be answered. The peculiar nature 
of the right being argued for herein calls for judicial activism .in spite 
of the limitations on the powers and institutional competence of 
courts described above. The reasoning in support of this position 
requires some development, to which we now turn. 
VI. THE BASIS OF A NEW JUDICIAL DOCTRINE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
A. Judicial Criteria 
The Griswold Court implictly disavowed a return to the era of 
substantive due process. Noting that in the modern era civil rights 
predominate over traditional property rights, the Court observed 
that: 
We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and 
propriety of laws which touch economic problems, business affairs or 
social conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate 
relation of Husband and Wife and their physician's role in one aspect 
of that relation. 1I8 
Answering Justice Black's criticism, it can be argued that rather 
than engaging in substantive due process, the Griswold majority 
was engaging in "selective incorporation" by giving recognition 
through the Due Process Clause to a right implicit in the Bill of 
Rights. Arguably, the Griswold Court merely recognized a right (the 
right of privacy) which it felt had always permeated the Constitu-
tion and was not engaging in policy decisions by "creating" substan-
tive constitutional guarantees.ll9 It may also be argued in passing 
that Justice Black failed to distinguish between the recognition of 
a constitutional right and the standard employed in determining the 
constitutionality of legislation infringing on the right. 120 
However, these observations do not provide a complete answer to 
Mr. Justice Black. In his terms, it is not enough (or perhaps even 
significant) to decide that the right to a reasonably non-hazardous 
environment is intrinsic to the person qua person, like the right to 
be free from other, more obvious forms of assault and battery. Be-
cause the Court applies a more stringent test to legislation chal-
lenged as infringing upon personal rights,121 the "preferred" status 
of this new personal right would invite a repetition of the pre-New 
Deal experience by creating a double standard of review. This criti-
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cism has never been directly answered, but there are two justifica-
tions for granting personal rights a preferred status over economic 
and social considerations. 
First, it is contended that while the states may experiment with 
social legislation regulating and restricting business and economic 
affairs, such power does not reside in the states with respect to 
personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution. '22 Personal rights 
are more "fragile" in nature than economic rights, and therefore the 
states do not have a free rein to experiment with them. 
A related argument is that personal rights are fixed in time, 
whereas economic rights may come and go according to the popular-
ity of a contemporary economic theory.'23 Personal rights are of a 
permanent nature; they establish the foundation of a free society 
which depends upon them for its vitality. On the other hand, eco-
nomic conditions can and should be subject to the popular will of 
legislatures to meet the changing needs of society. 
The obvious problem is to distinguish between personal and eco-
nomic rights. It could be argued that environmental issues are inex-
tricably tied to economic decisions. However, environmental rights 
should be granted a preferred status because they amount, in the 
final analysis, to the personal right not to be directly, physically, 
damaged. It is submitted that environmental rights are more basic 
and fundamental than many of our other rights because: (1) their 
breach may be irremedial, and (2) their breach may ultimately 
render the existence of other rights meaningless. 
Within the realm of economic decision-making, the courts will 
almost always defer to the other branches of government and allow 
experimentation to take place. The reason given is that if a particu-
lar decision is thought to be detrimental to societal interests it can 
be altered by resort to the political process. 124 However, this may not 
be possible when environmental degradation takes place. As one 
author observed: 
. . . [T]echnological impact has now reached dimensions of such mag-
nitude that society may never have the opportunity to reconsider "its" 
initial decision. The argument that society can revoke social security, 
minimum wages, Medicare, or the antitrust laws does not apply to 
many environmental problems. Society may not be able 'to bring back 
into existence a dead lake, our genetic pool if mutilated by radiation, 
or a habitable earth once it begins to cool because of air pollution. In 
other words, the arguments against judical review of substantive eco-
nomic decisions do not necessarily apply to review of substantive 
environmental-impact decisions. '25 
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Reasoning along these lines, it would seem that environmental 
considerations are of such a serious nature and are so "fragile" that 
they demand careful judicial scrutiny. 128 
Secondly, recognizing a constitutional right to a non-hazardous 
environment would simply acknowledge and protect the basic foun-
dation upon which our other rights exist. "We cannot enjoy our 
other rights if we are all dead."127 The framers of the Constitution 
did not worry about the ecosphere around them; a vast continent 
lay before their eyes. However, it cannot be concluded that our 
health and the quality of our lives are not somehow addressed by a 
document ". . . intended to endure for ages to come, and conse-
quently, to be adapted to the various crises for human affairs."128 
The second major criticism which Justice Black leveled at what 
he characterized as the "substantive due process approach" in 
Griswold was that judges must inevitably substitute their own per-
sonal biases and philosophies for that of the legislature in determin-
ing what unenumerated rights should be elevated to a Constitu-
tional plane. 129 Justice Harlan, concurring in the result in Griswold, 
replied that: 
While I could not more heartily agree that judicial "self restraint" is an 
indispensable ingredient of sound constitutional adjudication, I do sub-
mit that the formula suggested for achieving it is more hollow than real. 
"Specific" provisions of the Constitution, no less than "due process", 
lend themselves as readily to "personal" interpretations by judges 
whose constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitution in sup-
posed "tune with the times" . . .130 
Indeed, the mere fact that judges are continuously called upon to 
render their interpretations of broad provisions in the Constitution 
indicates that the Court is always in a position to abuse its power. 
However, this is no reason to abdicate the responsibility of exercis-
ing that power correctly. 131 
The Constitution is a living document, to be interpreted in a way 
which meets the challenges of modern society. 132 A narrow reading 
of its provisions would never allow us to cope with the problems of 
a growing technological society.'33 Moreover, the Court has been 
willing in the past to recognize the existence of implied rights in the 
Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause so as to keep that 
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document "in tune with the times" .134 Our growing environmental 
problems require an interpretation of the Constitution that will 
make that document even more meaningful in terms of the prob-
lems of our era. As the conditions of life in society change, we may 
very well need to rely on the courts to give meaning to unenumer-
ated rights so that society can adapt to those changed conditions. 
Assuming for the moment that environmental rights should be 
constitutionally protected, we must evaluate the proposition that 
the courts are the most suitable organ of our government to give 
meaning to them. 
B. Institutional Constraints 
Aside from the arguments that must be overcome in order to grant 
constitutional protection to the right to a reasonably non-hazardous 
environment, there are certain institutional limitations on the judi-
cal system that argue effectively against enforcement of the right by 
courts. As noted earlier,135 critics contend that: (1) adequate reme-
dies are already available under nuisance theories and, in any case, 
the question is inherently political in nature and therefore better left 
to the legislative, executive and administrative branches for 
conflict-resolution; (2) the courts do not have the requisite expertise 
or decisional standards to guide them in resolving issues presented 
in adjudications of an environmental right. 
It is quite true that recognition by a court of this or any other 
constitutional right may engage it in an anti-democratic process. 
However, as one author noted, " ... [The process] reflects a 
court's judgment that certain matters are too important to be left 
to the vagaries of majority Will."138 Thus judicial recognition of a 
constitutional environmental right, if such a right is as crucial to the 
existence of all others as many claim, may not subvert democratic 
principles, but rather give life to them. Judicial activism in this area 
may be both necessary and supportable. 
One court that argued against the creation of a judicial doctrine 
in the area of environmental rights observed that the traditional tort 
theory of nuisance is capable of resolving ecological disputes. 137 
However, a recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals illus-
trates the fallacy of this argument. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 
Co. ,138 (hereinafter cited as Boomer), plaintiffs were property owners 
near the defendant's cement plant, which was built after plaintiffs 
had moved into the community. They brought an action for nuis-
ance, seeking both damages and an injunction against defendant's 
further pollution. It was established in the trial court138 that defen-
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dants had installed the most efficient pollution control devices then 
available, and yet the pollution was still considerable. The Court of 
Appeals, after noting that the defendant had erected its plant at a 
cost of over $45,000,000 and employed over 300 workers,140 granted 
damages based upon the loss of usable value of the plaintiffs' prop-
erty.141 However, while admitting that defendant's activities consti-
tuted a nuisance, New York's highest court granted an injunction 
only until the payment of permanent damages. 142 This result oc-
curred even though the court acknowledged that the damages to the 
plaintiff were substantial and that the nuisance in all probability 
would continue unabated for some time. 143 Moreover, the court ig-
nored earlier New York decisions which supported plaintiffs' claim 
for permanent injunctive relief, and instead went outside the juris-
diction to find authority for its result. 144 
The opinion has been criticized for not effectively dealing with our 
growing pollution problems. 145 In failing to permanently enjoin de-
fendant's activities, the court relied on the traditional nuisance 
balance-of-equities doctrine, under which a court will refrain from 
granting equitable relief when the hardship to the defendant is be-
lieved to outweigh the benefit to the plaintiff. As commentatorsl46 
and the dissent in Boomer147 recognized, the practical effect of this 
approach is " ... a condemnation of private property for a private 
use by private individuals who do not have the power of eminent 
domain. "148 Plaintiff is granted a remedy for damages, but no right 
to stop his neighbor from harming him. 
A more obvious problem with the nuisance approach to environ-
mental degradation is that the party seeking relief usually must 
await an injury in fact before he or she can seek judicial relief. Given 
the facts of Boomer and the application of the balance-of-equities 
doctrine, one can appreciate why the court reached the result it did 
and refused to grant a permanent injunction. However, in the in-
terim, plaintiff must suffer damage; needless damage, since he 
should have been able to bring suit before the apparent injury oc-
curred. Thus, under traditional nuisance theory, a potential plain-
tiff finds himself in a "Catch-22" situation. Unable to bring suit 
before the apparent injury occurs, he must wait until he is in fact 
harmed, at which time it may be too late to obtain meaningful 
relief. 
Alternatively, one can reasonably maintain that nuisance actions 
are outdated because historically they have been generally accepted 
as the appropriate means to control only the isolated instance of 
localized pollution, while today, pollution has become a more perva-
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sive threat. 149 Boomer illustrates that nuisance actions are not 
achieving the hoped for result of controlling pollution. It is not hard 
to understand, therefore, why one author has complained that legal 
responses to the problems of ordering land use, responses relying on 
nuisance suits and zoning decisions". . . are not decisions how to 
use land but rather umpire decisions resolving or avoiding discor-
dant market-dictated uses."150 Indeed, "[g]iven decisions as in-
credibly unresponsive as Boomer, there is an urgent need to guaran-
tee on the constitutional level protection of individual rights in the 
environment. . . . "151 
As a suggested alternative, therefore, some states have enacted 
constitutional amendments to establish a right to a clean or health-
ful environment. 152 This approach can accomplish two discernible 
benefits. First, it allows the courts to become the ultimate authority 
(short of further constitutional amendment) on environmental 
rights. 153 Second, these amendments enunciate a public policy 
which requires all state agencies to consider the impact of their 
decisions on the environment before taking action.154 
Unfortunately, the results of this approach have not been very 
satisfactory. As one author concluded, ". . .such declarations have 
neither eliminated pollution nor redirected a state's priorities."155 
Among the deficiencies of these amendments, there is first a prob-
lem of drafting the provisions accurately so as to discourage narrow 
judicial interpretation that could all but defeat their purpose. The 
failure of the State of Pennsylvania to obtain an injunction under 
its own constitutional amendment against the building of an obser-
vation tower at the Gettysburg National Battlefield is a clear exam-
ple of this situation.158 
Moreover, few of the State constitutional amendments that have 
been enacted are self-executing. 157 Rather, the declarations call for 
the implementation of legislation designed to enunciate or supple-
ment the constitutional provisions. Even in those cases where the 
environmental provision commands legislative action, some state 
legislatures have not completely fulfilled their responsibilities. 15s As 
one author noted: 
.. .if legislatures are unwilling to enact legislation to guarantee citi-
zens' rights to a decent or healthful environment, constitutional provi-
sions may remain ineffectual platitudes. As a consequence, citizens hop-
ing to vindicate their environmental rights may have to move from the 
legislative to the judicial arena. IS8 
Prescinding from the intra-state problems with state constitu-
tional provisions, there are also interstate barriers. Leaving large 
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scale environmental problems outside the scope of federal control 
could result not only in inconsistent state policies, but even more 
importantly, inconsistent state judicial treatment of those poli-
cies. 160 The potential result of such an inconsistency of treatment is 
that one day we may very well see all of our industrial and economic 
development centered in a few anti-environmentally minded states. 
But even before that day, states feeling the pinch may decide to 
repeal environmental legislation in favor of "progress" and wealth. 
Thus: 
... any right to an environment suitable for human habitation must be 
something applicable equally to all the states lest laggard jurisdictions 
benefit economically from the reforms imposed elsewhere. An effort at 
the federal level appears to be the only answer161 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court had indicated some support for this notion. 
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,162 the Supreme Court recognized a 
cause of action under the federal common law of nuisance for an 
aggrieved state against a municipality of another state which was 
polluting common waters. The Court held that the federal common 
law of nuisance is a "law" of the United States within the meaning 
of the general "federal question" jurisdictional statute. 163 The Court 
observed that, " ... when we deal with air or water in their ambient 
or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law .... "164 The 
decision recognized the need for a federal forum to adjudicate envi-
ronmental questions of an interstate nature. 165 In this sense, the 
". . .state is now assured that its problem is of enough importance 
to the well-being of the national environment to be dealt with as a 
federal question and to be resolved by federal common law."166 Most 
importantly, the Court's ruling points to the need for a relatively 
uniform body of law applicable to the states through the federal 
courts. 
Even on the federal level, though, Congressional attempts to 
achieve a clear mandate for effective environmental protection have 
fallen short of success. Indeed, Congress has been a prolific source 
of "environmental" and "conservation" legislation in recent years, 
intended to cope with our ecological imbalance. 167 Yet on the whole, 
environmental writers have not only found existing statutory legis-
lation inadequate to achieve the task,168 but also in some instances, 
improperly enforced by administrative agencies. 169 Moreover, Con-
gress has circumvented its own legislative schemes when it felt the 
desire for economic progress to be a more paramount objective. 170 
Finally, it is to be noted that recent efforts seeking Congressional 
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passage of legislation with strong constitutional implications have 
either been watered down or died in committee. For example, when 
the National Environmental Policy Actl71 first passed the Senate it 
contained a provision granting each person ". . . a fundamental 
and inalienable right to a healthful environment."172 When finally 
enacted, the language granting a legal right had been diluted to a 
mere hortatory statement of official policy.173 Also, in both the 92nd 
and 93rd Congresses, the Environmental Protection Act174 proposed 
by Senator Hart of Michigan met a quiet death in the Committee 
on Commerce. 
As an alternative to statutory enactments, an attempt has been 
made to amend the Federal Constitution.175 This effort, by Senator 
Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, failed to gain majority support in 
Congress. However, even if such an amendment did gain Congres-
sional approval, it would still take several years to obtain the neces-
sary ratification of the measure by three-fourths of the state legisla-
tures.178 It is submitted that this nation cannot afford to put off to 
a later day what is urgently needed now: a mandate of constitu-
tional protection for our environment. Moreover, an approach to the 
problem which would favor the amendment process over judicial 
recognition of a right ignores the vital function of courts to give 
meaning to the Constitution's textual phrases in light of the chal-
lenges of a modem society.177 Finally, a more practi<:al reason for 
relying on the courts to recognize the claimed right as constitutional 
in nature is that " ... the amendment process rather than ordinary 
legislative action [then becomes necessary] for its repeal or sub-
stantial alteration."17s 
The ultimate question is presented: Should the courts". . . stand 
marking time, anticipating a moment when the environment deteri-
orates to such a point that the Court is compelled to confirm that, 
along with free speech and religion, there exists a right to an envi-
ronment fit for human habitation ... "?178 It is submitted that 
because our political institutions have not effectively responded to 
this question, the courts must fill the vacuum. 
The courts, rather than the legislature, may be the branch of 
government most capable of preventing the future despoliation of 
our environment. The legislature failed to make the initial response 
to the race problem, ISO to gerrymandering, lSI to consumer protec-
tion,ls2 to abortion rights,l83 and to the individual's right to marital 
privacy.1S4 Judges had to take the first step toward reorienting socie-
tal values, making democracy more than a dead letter. True, the 
courts risked losing their credibility as a nonpolitical institution in 
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each instance, but these decisions were necessitated and perhaps 
even caused, to some extent, by the resistance to change in the other 
branches of government. 185 
These instances of pioneering judicial activism accentuate a basic 
premise of our government: that". . . the Court has been the device 
by which questions of fundamental structure have been resolved in 
this country."188 Society's relationship to the environment is an area 
in which some fundamental restructuring must take place. The 
courts should recognize a constitutional right to a reasonably non-
hazardous environment. The result of such a declaration, as one 
author so aptly put it: 
. . . would compel a restructuring of our conventional wisdom in favor 
of the pursuit of a quality environment rather than the contemporary 
involvement in quantity consumption which is undercutting that envi-
ronment. 187 
A judicial declaration of environmental rights would not only serve 
as our conscience for conduct in the future, but even more impor-
tantly, it would impose a duty on legislatures to exercise their power 
when the public interest required it}88 The immediate need for 
effective environmental control suggests that the ecology can no 
longer be subject solely to political considerations. 
Having argued that the courts should take an activist role through 
the recognition of a constitutional mandate in the area, the question 
then becomes can they? Opponents of the activist position argue 
that the courts do not have the expertise to deal in matters that may 
become very technical and scientific}89 Concomitantly, without 
standards to guide a court in this area of the law, inconsistencies 
may arise between various courts on the resolution of any given 
issue. 
In reply to the first point, environmentalists with litigation expe-
rience contend that the cases to date have not been unusually com-
plicated}BO Alternatively, it has been noted that given the courts' 
ability to handle complex issues like patent infringement, securities 
regulation and antitrust cases, judges should not have any greater 
difficulty in deciding environmental issues as well. IBI 
Of course, expert testimony in this area of the law is always sub-
ject to conflicting trends of thought, often making it speculative and 
possibly contradictory. But given the necessity of environmental 
protection, and the courts' traditional role as fact-finders often 
faced with the resolution of conflicting testimony, this latter objec-
tion loses much of its initial plausibility}92 Professor Joseph L. Sax 
of the University of Michigan School of Law has argued that it is a 
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myth to believe there is something unique about environmental law 
that places it outside the range of judicial competence. 193 He con-
tends that precisely because the courts are not experts, they are 
more amenable to broader considerations and therefore more impar-
tial in reaching a decision than would be a so-called "expert": 
What we are talking about is the need to have an institutional format 
in which some supervision can be given to the agencies to protect them 
against the inevitable excess of the professional point of view. . . to the 
pressures which we realistically know are brought to bear from time to 
time on every agency; and as our experience in Michigan has suggested, 
to use the judicial process, not only for supervision, in the sense of 
bringing a broader perspective than the internalized narrow view of the 
specialized expert, but also to help to liberate the expert from the pres-
sures which he inevitably finds himself subjected to simply because of 
the nature of the process that he is a part of.IU4 
A judicial forum should not be deterred from adjudicating environ-
mental suits simply because judges are not initially any more expert 
in this area than in others. 
Moreover, the current lack of judicial standards is no reason for 
declining to enunciate a doctrine of environmental rights. 195 Admit-
tedly, the dimensions of a right to a reasonably non-hazardous envi-
ronment will be imprecise at first. But it is fair to anticipate that 
on the basis of case-by-case experience, content and meaning will 
be given to that right so that a fair degree of certainty as to its 
implications will develop over time. 19ft 
Just like the destruction of the status quo wrought by Brown v. Board 
of Education, and like the excursion in the "political thicket" symbol-
ized by Baker v. Carr, this approach will also demand a long, gruelling 
campaign of difficult decisions to give content to the original de clara-
tion. 197 
In the end, the evolution of precedent will supply the necessary 
content through an application of the same principles of equity 
which have enabled courts in the past to fashion remedies for newly-
recognized rights. 19s 
The courts already have a base upon which they can decide what 
standards will be used to give meaning to the content of the right. 
For example, commentators suggest that the degradation must be 
"unreasonable".199 This would comport with the reasonableness 
standard used to decide issues concerning explicit constitutional 
provisions incorporated under the Due Process Clause (e.g., "unrea-
sonable" searches and seizures).2oo By using a reasonableness stan-
dard, the courts could weigh the balance between individual rights 
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and societal progress. As in other situations where fundamental 
personal liberties are involved, the state would be required to show 
a compelling interest in order to prevail over the plaintiff where 
unreasonable degradation has been shown.201 However, even upon a 
showing of a compelling state interest, the means used to achieve 
the given purpose cannot be employed if they broadly stifle the right 
to a reasonably non-hazardous environment and the end can be 
achieved by more narrowly confined measures. 202 If the courts' abil-
ity in the past to create standards of review and give meaning to 
vague provisions is an index of their ability to adjudicate environ-
mental issues under a constitutional mandate, further postpone-
ment of judicial intervention in the area based upon a "lack of 
standards" argument appears to be unsupportable. 
CONCLUSION 
A constitutional mandate protecting the environment is long 
overdue. Environmental degradation is a long-range public health 
menace, no less dangerous because sub-clinical. It has been submit-
ted that the courts should recognize that each individual has a 
fundamental right to a reasonably non-hazardous environment. The 
outcome of such action would as a minimum establish that all gov-
ernmental agencies, state as well as federal, must take environmen-
tal considerations into account when making decisions. 203 Moreover, 
it would create a cause of action independent of statutory or com-
mon law grounds. Equally important, the burden of proof would be 
shifted to the private or governmental defendant once a prima facie 
case of environmental degradation was shown by the plaintiff.204 
This is current court procedure in civil rights employment discrimi-
nation cases.205 Moreover, given the need for judicial activism in this 
area of the law, granting substantive as well as procedural protec-
tions would be consistent with the present practice of the courts in 
equal protection and free speech cases. Although there are fears that 
the federal courts would be unduly congested with environmental 
suits if the courts were to enunciate a constitutional right to a rea-
sonably non-hazardous environment,206 these concerns appear to be 
unfounded. 207 As one environmental attorney has observed: 
I sympathize with those who are concerned about the overburdening of 
the Federal courts. But the determination as to which cases should be 
heard in Federal courts should be made on the basis of the importance 
of the cases to the country. Based on this [sic] criteria, environmental 
litigation is clearly as important as any cases heard in the Federal courts 
and far more important than most.208 
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Assuming that an environmental constitutional right was recog-
nized by the courts, other hurdles (beyond the scope of this article) 
such as standing to sue209 and state action210 would have to be ad-
dressed in any given case. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the right 
to a reasonably non-hazardous environment is fundamental and 
implicit in our Constitution. Judicial activism to enunciate, develop 
and protect this right is suggested as one possible solution to our 
continuing environmental crisis. 
-.~.-
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Case No. C73-1159, filed Jan. 7th, 1974 at 2. See also, Pinkney v. 
Ohio EPA, 375 F. Supp. 305, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1974). 
8 See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
• 375 F .Supp. 305, 310. 
10 451 F.2d. 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). 
11 Id., at 1137-38. 
12 Id., at 1139. 
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14 325 F.Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
15 ld., at 738-39. 
18 340 F.Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972). 
541 
17 See, C.A. Wright, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, (2d. Ed. 1970) at 
62. Ct., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); Bell v. Hood, 327 
U.S. 678 (1946). 
18 340 F.Supp. 532, 535. The Ninth Amendment provides that: 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
19 340 F. Supp. 532, 535. 
20 "Only if a State deprives any person or denies him enforcement 
of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment can its protec-
tion be invoked." Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 
U.S. 70, 72 (1955). " ... [T]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 'have reference to State action exclusively, and not to 
any action of private individuals.'. . . 'It is State action of a partic-
ular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual 
rights is not the subject matter of the Amendment.' " Corrigan v. 
Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926). Ct., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). See, e.g., 
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (Judicial enforcement of a 
restrictive covenant held to constitute state action). The import-
ance of establishing "state action" in an environmental suit, there-
fore, is that the guarantees of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot be invoked without the showing of a requisite 
amount of state involvement in the pollution process. 
21 340 F.Supp. 532, 536-37. 
22 ld., at 537. 
23 The two terms have been used interchangeably to denote the 
substance of the right. This article will proceed on the basis that the 
right is to have a reasonably non-hazardous environment, since the 
requirements of assuring a clean environment may impose too great 
a burden on the state. Moreover, our environment may be unclean 
and yet impose no substantial interference with personal rights. One 
author has defined the right in terms of an environment at least 
predominantly comprised of air which is not a health hazard, non-
combustible waterways and a food supply uncontaminated with 
carcinogenic and other hazardous residues. See, Beckman, The 
Right to a Decent Environment Under the Ninth Amendment, 46 
L.A. BAR. BULL. 415, 416 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Beckman). 
Also, state legislatures, in drafting constitutional amendments for 
environmental protection, have encountered problems as to the use 
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of the terms "healthful" and "beautiful". See, Tobin, Some Obser-
vations on the Use of State Constitutions to Protect the 
Environment, 3 ENV. AFF. 473, 478-81 (1973) (hereinafter cited as 
Tobin) for a full discussion of this problem. 
24 James River and Kanawha Canal Parks v. RMA, 359 F.Supp. 
611 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
25 Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 4 ERC 1892 (E.D. Tenn. 
1972). 
26 See, Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F.Supp. 1061 (N.D. 
W.Va. 1973), which relied on all three cases. See also, Fair v. Volpe, 
5 ERC 1205 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Cf., T.W. Guthrie v. Alabama By-
Products Co., 328 F.Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ala. 1971); In Re Motor Vehi-
cle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 52 F.R.D. 398, 402 (C.D. Cal. 
1970). 
27 Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F.Supp. 573 (E.D.Va. 1972). 
28 1 ERC 1640 (D.C. Mont. 1970). 
29 [d., at 1641. 
30 Pinkney v. Ohio EPA, 375 F.Supp. 305, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1974). 
31 Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 536 (S.D.Tex. 
1972). 
32 "Penumbras" may be defined as "peripheral" rights emanating 
from the explicit guarantees in the Constitution. For a full discus-
sion of terminology as applied to the issues raised in this article, see 
n. 100-106 infra and accompanying text. 
33 Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 535; E.D.F. v. 
Corps of Engineers, 325 F.Supp. 7~8, 739. 
34 Cf., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965), 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
35 Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537. Cf., E.D.F. 
v. Hoerner Waldorf, 1 ERC 1640, 1643 (D.C. Mont. 1970). 
36 [d., at 536; Little, Note: The Aftermath of the Clean Air: 
Amendments of 1970: The Federal Courts and Air Pollution, 14 B.C. 
IND. & COMM. L. REV. 724, 756 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Little); 
Neustadter, The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with the 
Problems of Environmental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1070, 
1075-77 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Neustadter); Cramton and 
Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise? 
2 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 407, 410-13 (1972) (hereinafter cited as 
Cramton and Boyer). 
37 Little, supra n. 36 at 756; Cramton and Boyer, supra n. 36 at 
413-15; Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F.Supp. 532, 536; E.D.F. 
v. Hoerner Waldorf, 1 ERC 1640, 1642-43 (D.C. Mont. 1970). 
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38 411 U.S. 1, 30. 
39 411 U.S. 1, 33-34. At the conclusion of these remarks, Justice 
Powell cited a number of cases he believed to be in support of this 
proposition: Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 
(1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. reI. Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
40 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. reI. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
41 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
42 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
43 411 U.S. 1, 100. 
44 Id. 
45 E.g., Sauntry, Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative to 
Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEO. L. J. 1173, 1184 
(1974) (hereinafter cited as Sauntry); Noll, Comment: San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez: A Retreat From Equal 
Protection, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 585, 595 (1973) (hereinafter cited 
as Noll); Eisen, Comment: Equal Protection of the Laws: Education 
Is Not a Fundamental Right, 26 UNIV. FLA. L. REV. 155, 159 (1973) 
(hereinafter cited as Eisen). 
46 Johnson, Comment: The Constitutional Right of Bilingual 
Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 So. CAL. L. REV. 
943, 976 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Johnson). 
47 411 U.S. 1, 109-10. 
48 Eisen, supra n. 45, at 159. 
49 For example, Justice Powell disregarded the importance of the 
service performed by the state (in this case, education) as a determi-
nant of fundamentality, " ... for purposes of examination under the 
Equal Protection Clause." 411 U.S. 1, 30. . 
50 A reading of the procedural and right to privacy due process 
cases, (see n. 69-79 infra and accompanying text) will show the 
different contours, dimensions and standards under such an analy-
sis of fundamental rights that is presented in San Antonio Ind. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 
56 (1972), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
51 411 U.S. 1, 20. 
52 Id., at 23-24. 
53 Id., at 24. 
54 Id., at 37. 
55 Justice Powell did not reach the question of what the result in 
the case would have been if Texas did not provide plaintiff-
appellees with an adequate education. However, it is hard not to 
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read into the majority opinion an adequacy requirement. Otherwise, 
Justice Powell would not have been able to answer the implied 
rights-nexus argument. As it is, the majority's response to the im-
plied rights argument has been criticized for not taking into account 
the realities of our competitive society where those with more than 
"enough" education can more easily get ahead. On this last point 
see, San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 at 113-14 
n. 72, 115-16 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting opinion); Noll, supra 
n. 45, at 597. 
58 Noll, supra n. 45, at 597. 
57 In comparing the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as 
interpreted by the Court, it should be remembered that the 
Rodriguez Court was asserting that discrimination vis-a-vis the 
Equal Protection Clause does not result as long as a minimum level 
of protection is granted to a given interest, even though some may 
be deriving greater benefits. See, n. 51-56, supra and accompanying 
text. See also, Johnson, supra n. 46, at 975. 
58 See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 
111-17 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Compare, the majority 
opinion of Justice Douglas in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942) with the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Stone, id., at 
543-45. In each of these instances, a distinction between an equal 
protection analysis and due process analysis is drawn in the manner 
suggested in the text. 
59 Note the approach taken in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 
(1973), where the woman's right to have an abortion uninhibited by 
interference from the State is limited to the end of the first trimes-
ter: "We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy. . . 
is not unqualified and must be considered against important state 
interest in regulation." Id. See also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 
U.S. 516, 524 (1960). A compelling state interest test has been sug-
gested for environmental litigation asserting a fundamental right to 
a reasonably non-hazardous environment under the Due Process 
Clause, (see Pearson, supra n. 1, at 478-79) and under the Ninth 
Amendment; see, V.J. Yannacone, et. al., ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 
AND REMEDIES, Vol. 1, at 61 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Yannacone); 
Beckman, supra n. 23, at 453. See also, n. 201-202 infra and accom-
panying text. 
80 On the basis of the distinctive approach taken by the Court 
when engaging in a due process analysis (as opposed to an equal 
protection analysis) it is suggested that in addition to Rodriguez, 
the equal protection cases Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no 
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fundamental right to housing), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471 (1970) (no fundamental right to welfare benefits), should not 
pose any hurdles to the recognition of a right to a reasonably non-
hazardous environment under an alleged violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause. This argument will be developed in the next section, 
see n. 61-79 infra, and accompanying text. Even assuming, 
arguendo, that the more restrictive Rodriguez standard is applica-
ble, it can still be argued by analogy that while a court need not 
guarantee the "cleanest" or "best possible" environment, certain 
minimum standards are essential pre-requisites to the enjoyment of 
all other rights granted by the Constitution. 
61 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937). Compare 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) which overruled the spe-
cific holding in Palko, but re-affirmed the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as making federally guaranteed rights applicable to the 
states, id., at 793-96. 
62 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
63 [d., at 328. 
64 [d., at 325. 
65 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
66 [d., at 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting opinion). 
67 [d., at 89. 
68 [d., at 90. Justice Murphy in his dissenting opinion carried the 
Black approach one step further, stating that: 
.. .I am not prepared to say that the [Fourteenth Amendment] is 
entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions may 
arise where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to fundamental 
standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation in 
terms of a lack of due process despite the absence of a specific provision 
in the Bill of Rights. 
[d., at 124, (Murphy, J., dissenting opinion). In essence, Justice 
Murphy had presaged the growing recognition of implied rights 
emanating from the explicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights. See n. 
73-75 infra and accompanying text. 
69 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969). 
70 See n. 51 supra. 
71 Ct., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louis-
iana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
72 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1968). As will be dis-
cussed infra (n. 81-83, 99-111 and accompanying text), the contro-
versy over incorporation has become somewhat diffused as a result 
of the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965). Moreover, as Professor Redlich has noted, since 
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most of the Bill of Rights has already been incorporated, the princi-
pal attention of the Court will be devoted to the meaning of these 
provisions. Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by 
the People?", 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 794-95 (1962) (hereinafter 
cited as Redlich). 
73 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion rights); 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (search and seizure); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital rights). However, 
as Mr. Justice Blackmun observed in Roe v. Wade: 
. . .only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental or implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty," ... are included in this guarantee 
of personal privacy. 
410 U.S. 113, 152. 
74 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), (right to 
maintain one's good name, reputation, honor or integrity); United 
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex. reI. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), (right of association); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), (freedom to marry); Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 
(1958), (freedom to travel); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 
(1963), (right of access to the courts); Board of Education v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), (right to refuse to salute and pledge 
allegiance to the flag); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925), (right to educate a child in a school of the parent's 
choice-whether public, private or parochial); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923), (right to study any particular subject or any 
foreign language). 
75 See n. 72 supra and accompanying text. 
76 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
77 [d., at 27. 
78 Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, Pinkney v. Ohio E.P.A. 
Case No. 74-1343, at 3. Ct., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967). 
79 See, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting opinion). Ct., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 773-789 (1974) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting opinion) (hereinafter cited as Levy). In the 
Levy case, Appellee challenged his court martial conviction par-
tially on the ground that two articles of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice were "void for vagueness" under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court held the arti-
cles not unconstitutionally vague, citing precedent dating from the 
turn of the century. In his dissent, Justice Stewart remarked: 
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It is true, of course, that a line of prior decisions of this Court,. . have 
(sic) upheld against constitutional attack the ancestors of today's gen-
eral articles. With all respect for the principles of stare decisis, however, 
I believe that these decisions should be given no authoritative force in 
view of what is manifestly a vastly "altered historic environment." 
Id., at 781. 
80 This follows from the argument that one of our "basic societal 
values" is the preservation of the human species. Cr., Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
81 1 ERC 1640 (D.C. Mont. 1970). 
82 Id., at 1641. 
83 Esposito, supra n. 1, at 48. 
84 As Justice Douglas has observed, "liberty ... gains context 
from the emanations of other specific [constitutional] guarantees 
... or from experience with the requirements of a free society." Poe 
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting opin-
ion). See also, id., at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting opinion), and 
Abrams, What Are the Rights Guaranteed By the Ninth 
Amendment?, 53 A.B.A.J. 1033, 1037 (1967) (hereinafter cited as 
Abrams). 
85 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
86 Id., at 153. 
87 Id., at 153, 207-08, (Burger, C.J., concurring opinion). 
88 Id., at 153. 
89 One final approach to this issue is indicated by the Supreme 
Court's increasing acceptance (though piecemeal) of the generalized 
notion that one has a "right to be let alone". (See, n.73 supra and 
accompanying text). Beginning with the dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-79 
(1928), the Court has become more receptive to granting protections 
to the individual from intrusions by the Government into personal 
affairs. Not only have surveillance activities by the State been pro-
scribed, but also intrusions into marital privacy, Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and a woman's decision to have an 
abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Arguably, it would not 
be a misreading of the above precedents to say that a contaminated 
environment intrudes upon one's "right to be let alone". 
90 Beckman, supra n. 23; Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amend-
ment: The Other Rights Retained By the People, 51 MARQUETTE L. 
REV. 121 (1968); B. Patterson, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT, 
(1955); Redlich, supra n. 72; Roberts, An Environmental Lawyer 
Urges: Plead the Ninth Amendment, Natural History (August-
September, 1970) (hereinafter cited as Roberts). See also, Yanna-
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cone, supra n. 59. In support of the notion that the Ninth Amend-
ment was to apply for the protection of the individual and not the 
states, see, A.T. Mason, FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING, (1965), 
at 316. 
91 381 U.S. 479, 486-99, (Goldberg, J., concurring opinion joined 
by Warren, C.J., and Brennan,J.) Justice Douglas in an opinion 
joined by Justice Clark, mentioned the Ninth Amendment, stated 
what it provides in explicit terms, and implied that marital privacy 
emanates as a penumbra from its provisions. If one were to say that 
all un enumerated rights are to be implicitly derived from express 
rights, then it is possible to argue that there were five members of 
the Griswold Court in agreement. That this is probably what Mr. 
Justice Douglas meant is indicated in his dissenting remarks in 
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 352 (1966). 
92 Beckman, supra n. 23, at 418-20. 
93 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
94 381 U.S. 479, 492. See also, Esposito, supra n. 1, at 47. 
95 Pearson, supra n. 1, at 461. 
96 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (Black. J., dissent-
ing opinion). 
97 381 U.S. 479, 493. 
98 See, Snyder v. Massachussetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
99 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring opinion). 
100 381 U.S. 479, 484-86. See also, Hanks et. al., The Right to a 
Habitable Environment, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS-WHAT THEY 
ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE. (Dorsen, Ed., 1971) at 153 (herein-
after cited as Hanks). 
101 381 U.S. 479, 483-84. Pearson, supra n. 1, at 459-60. 
102 381 U.S. 479, 484. 
103 Id., at 484-86. 
104 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
105 See, Pearson, supra n. 1, at 463, and Plaintiffs-Appellant's 
Opening Brief, Pinkney v. Ohio E.P.A., Case No. 74-1343, filed 
January 7th, 1974, at 26. 
106 Hanks, supra n. 100, at 153; Roberts, supra n. 1, at 691. 
107 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); Williamson v. 
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Lincoln Federal Labor Union 
v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); West 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 
U.S. 502 (1934). 
108 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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109 Redlich, supra n. 72, at 794-95. 
110 Id. See also, Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 
116 PENN. L. REv. 1048 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Ratner). 
111 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952); 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Ct., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 
455, 462 (1942). 
112 Redlich, supra n. 72, at 794. See also, Adamson v. California, 
332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting opinion), and Betts 
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474-77 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting opinion). 
Justice Black later reaffirmed his position with a vigorous dissent 
in the Griswold case: 
The due process clause with an "arbitrary and capricious" or "shocking 
to the conscience" formula was liberally used by this Court to strike 
down economic legislation in the early decades of this century, threaten-
ing, many people thought, the tranquility of the nation .... That for-
mula, based on subjective considerations of "natural justice", is no less 
dangerous when used to enforce this Court's views about personal rights 
than those about economic rights. I had thought we had laid that for-
mula, as a means for striking down state legislation, to rest once and 
for all. 
381 U.S. 479, 522. 
113 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-12. 
114 Id., at 513, 521. 
115 Ratner, supra n. 110, at 1063. 
118 Little, supra n. 36, at 756. See also, Neustadter, supra n. 36, 
at 1075-77, and Cramton and Boyer, supra n. 36, at 196-99. 
117 Hanks, supra n. 100, at 153-54. Cramton and Boyer, supra n. 
36, at 413-15. Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F.Supp. 532, 536 
(S.D.Tex. 1972). 
118 381 U.S. 479, 482. 
119 As Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion for Gris-
wold, had said in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497,521 (1961), "This notion of privacy is not drawn from the blue. 
It emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under 
which we live." 
120 See, State v. Abellano, 441 P.2d 333, 338 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 
1968) (Levinson, J., concurring). 
121 The Supreme Court has granted a preferred status to the asser-
tion of First Amendment freedoms (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943)), equal protection rights (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)), and to the "one 
man-one vote" principle (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). 
550 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
See also, United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
n. 4 (1938), where the first indication of the preferred status ap-
proach appeared. Note that Justice Stone did not necessarily limit 
the application of the preferred status approach to the rights listed 
above. 
122 See, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517-18 (1961) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting opinion). Ct., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 
(1946). 
123 See, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949), where Justice 
Frankfurter spelled out this notion while discussing Justice Holmes' 
theory on personal rights. Ct., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 
541 (1942); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1938). 
124 Hanks, supra n. 100, at 151. See also n. 122 supra and accom-
panying text. 
125 Hanks, supra n. 100, at 152. 
128 Sive, Environmental Lawyers, supra n. 1, at 643. 
127 Roberts, supra n. 90, at 26. See also, Beckman, supra n. 23, at 
451-52 and Esposito, supra n. 1, at 46. One Federal court has already 
intimated that environmental rights are "preferred". See, E.D.F. v. 
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (1971). 
128 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 203 (1819). 
129 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 518-19 (1965) (Black, 
J., dissenting opinion). 
130 Id., at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring opinion). Moreover, Profes-
sor Redlich has indicated that under the Ninth Amendment a guid-
ing judicial standard could be set up: the rights reserved are to be 
of a nature comparable to the rights enumerated, Redlich, supra n. 
72, at 810, 812. Following this suggested standard, he demonstrates 
how Lochner can easily be distinguished from a case like Griswold: 
The right of employees to contract with employers concerning hours of 
work, which was the right upheld in Lochner v. New York, hardly fits 
into the scheme of rights set forth in our Constitution. But, the right of 
a married couple to maintain the intimacy of their marital relationship 
free from the criminal sanction of the state does fit into the pattern of a 
society which set forth in its national character that men should be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Id., at 811. The actual approach taken by Mr. Justice Goldberg 
under the Ninth Amendment, utilizing the fundamental rights 
theory, is analogous to the judicial test proposed by Professor Red-
lich. See n. 72 supra and accompanying text. 
131 See, State v. Abellano, 441 P.2d 333, 338 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 
1963) (Levinson, J., concurring opinion). 
132 Id., at 338-39. See also, Hanks, supra n. 100, at 149. In this 
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context the words of Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252 
U.S.416, 433 (1920), carry a special meaning: 
... when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like 
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have 
called into life a being the development of which could not have been 
forseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for 
them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has 
taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to 
prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered 
in the light of our whole experience, and not merely in that of what was 
said a hundred years ago. 
133 See n. 76-79 supra and accompanying text. 
134 See n. 73-75 supra and accompanying text. 
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